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ABSTRACT 
 
The main purpose of the research is to evaluate determinant factors 
which contribute to companies being delisted from Stock Exchange 
Market in Indonesia. The samples are taken from the delisted 
companies list in IDX for a period year 2007-2011. The matching 
companies are then selected based on the company size to make an 
equivalent comparison for each delisted companies sample. The total 
final samples consist of 58 companies, 29 delisted companies and 29 
matching companies. This research analyzes the company’s financial 
status by using descriptive statistics, independent sample t-test, and 
logistic regression model to find the effect of each determinant to the 
probability of delisting. The shares liquidity is a significant 
determinant to company’s delisting in Indonesia. Meanwhile, 
profitability and leverage seems to be determinant factors for delisted, 
but appear to be insignificant. Other examined factors, market 
capitalization and growth opportunity appear to insignificant 
determinants. This manager implication of this research is that the 
strong delisting factor is the external company factor, in this case, the 
market factor, 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
One of many corporate financial issues that affect the listed company 
in regional stock exchange is delisting. Delisting itself is defined as 
the removal of listed company’s stock from the stock exchange 
market on which it trades (Siddaiah, 2011). 
In Indonesia, delisting is quite a new issue in corporate finance 
research. The phenomena of the delisting in Indonesia started to 
immerse in 1996, when PT Praxair Indonesia Tbk were announced 
delisted. Then, in 2002, three listed companies (PT Pfizer Indonesia 
Tbk., PT Miwon Indonesia Tbk., PT Indocopper Investama Tbk) were 
delisted in 2002 (Hernawan, 2005). The IDX statistic shows that at 
least 10 companies have been delisted from Indonesia Stock 
Exchanges ince 2009 (IDX, 2012). 
 
In 2011, Indonesia Stock Exchange delisted 5 public companies (IDX, 
2011). “This year delisting events are not the record because more 
delisting events are occurred in 2009. Delisting is caused by go 
private companies, such as AQUA and Alfa Retailindo and Dynaplast. 
This is unavoidable due to globalization,” as stated by Ito Warsito, as 
Chief Director of Indonesia Stock Exchange, in the last press 
conference in 2011 at Indonesia Stock Exchange building, Jakarta, 
December 30
th
  (Seputar Indonesia, 2011).  
 
Table 1. Number of Delisted Companies in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2007-2011 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
8 6 11 1 5 31 
Source: www.idx.co.id 
 
The delisting can be distinguished into two types, which are 
forced/compulsory delisting and voluntary delisting (Siddaiah, 2011). 
Some of the shareholders may be willing to choose to delist the 
company they invest in, this is known as voluntary delisting, where 
the delisting is done by the approval of General Meeting of the 
Shareholders; this voluntary delisting is referred to as a “Going 
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Private Transaction” (GPT) (Djama et al., 2012).Research stated that 
in 1993-1994; approximately 70 public companies which are listed in 
stock exchange market in United States became “go-private” 
companies (Hernawan and Tirtayatra, 2005). While in the forced 
delisting context, a firm gets delisted because it experiences financial 
distress or has been merged and/or acquired by another firm (Djama et 
al., 2012). 
 
Staging Connections Group Limited (ASX: STG) is one example of 
company’s voluntary delisting. The company through its Letter of 
ASX Announcement announced that it has realized a buy-back of 
ordinary shares for shareholders that hold less than marketable parcel 
of shares in order to reduce the costs associated with the unmarketable 
parcels (Staging Connections Group Limited (ASX: STG): ASX 
Announcement, 2011). On the other hand, Automated Touchstone 
Machine Limited, a case of forced delisting, was delisted from 
Singapore Stock Exchange in September 2008 due to internal control 
failure, which is caused by internal audit issue (Loon and Pica, 2010). 
In the most extreme cases, parent companies could take assets from its 
listed subsidiary after subsidiary’s value added from the Initial Public 
Offering, like it happened to the first-ever forced delisting case, or 
even first-ever delisting case in China by ST Monkey King Company 
(Loon and De Ramos, 2009). These cases are several examples of 
delisting events which are happened worldwide. 
 
There are some more reasons why company is delisted, for both 
voluntary and forced delisting. To the authors’ knowledge there is no 
study has been undertaken to examine the internal and market factors 
that cause the companies being delisted in Indonesia market.  
Therefore, this paper aims to identify the determinant factors of 
delisting which occurred in the stock exchange market in Indonesia, 
and the characteristics of a company which has the possibility of 
being delistedin IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange). 
 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
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Delisitng 
Decision of Board of Directors of The Jakarta Stock Exchange (2004), 
concerning Delisting and Relisting of Securities at the Exchange, 
define delisting as follows: 
“PenghapusanPencatatan (Delisting)means the delisting of Securities 
from the Securities list listed at the Exchange, consequently they 
cannot be traded at the Exchange.” 
Mantysaari (2009), as well as Black (1990), defines delisting as the 
termination of the securities which formerly admitted to trading on a 
certain market. In addition, Siddaiah (2011) also stated delisting of 
securities as permanent removal of securities of a listed company 
from a stock exchange.  The public company whose shares are being 
delisted will turn to a privately held company; this is implied as 
delisting, although the delisted company may continue to be a public 
limited company. He then stated that a delisted security will make the 
investors to lose the opportunity to exchange these securities. 
 
 Classifications of Delisting 
Siddaiah (2011) and Das, et al. (2004) categorized delisting into two 
forms, which are voluntary delisting and involuntary/compulsory 
delisting. 
 
The company itself may delist its shares from stock exchange where it 
is listed by achieving at least 75 percent approval in General 
Shareholder’s Meeting for the resolution of delisting decision. One 
example of company’s voluntary delisting si Staging Connections 
Group Limited (ASX: STG). The company through its Letter of ASX 
Announcement declared that it has executed a buy-back of common 
shares for shareholders that hold less than marketable parcel of shares 
in order to reduce the costs associated with the unmarketable parcels. 
Through its Annual General Meeting, the Board has decided to put a 
resolution to shareholders to seek removal Company’s securities from 
quotation on Australia Stock Exchange, after carefully considering 
several alternatives (Staging Connections Group Limited (ASX: STG): 
ASX Announcement, 2011). 
 
In contrast, Das (2004) and Chaplinsky, et al. (2006) as well as 
Siddaiah (2011) stated that, in compulsory/involuntary delisting, the 
securities of listed company is compulsorily/forcefully removed by 
the stock exchange itself under certain procedures since the company 
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is unable to fulfill the stock exchange’s regulatory standards; most 
often cases due to poor performance. The required procedures for 
listing standards are, for example, required net income, required 
number of shareholders, required market capitalization, etc (Das, 
2004). 
 
 The Delisting Process 
The delisting process, stated by Board of Directors of The Jakarta 
Stock Exchange Inc. (2004) and Mantysaari (2009), can be differed 
between delisting of shares by request of the Listed Company and 
delisting of shares by the Exchange. 
Widjaja (2009) and Macey et al. (2003) stated that in New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), Exchange Committee will only delist shares by 
company’s request, if company sufficiently fulfilled certain 
circumstances of delisting criteria. Before the delisting is completed, 
NYSE will give a notification through written report to the company, 
which must then issue a press release. The company may request to 
review the decision to the Committee of the Board of Directors of the 
Exchange, within ten days after receiving the notification. The 
company then will give briefs and oral arguments to the Committee 
about the delisting. The request for review usually stays the delisting 
proceedings. During the review, the Exchange may suspend the 
security trading, even though delisting is not yet finalized.  Finally, if 
the review is failed to be accomplished, the Exchange will discontinue 
the trading and apply to remove the security from listing to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Similar procedure of 
delisting by company’s request could be found in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) and Nasdaq. 
 
Meanwhile, the procedure of delisting of shares by the Exchange, 
based on Decision of Board of Directors of the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange Inc.Number: Kep-308/BEJ/07-2004, concerning Delisting 
and Relisting of Securities at the Exchange, are as follows: 
1. If there is an indication that Listed Company experiences one or 
more conditions stated in the listing requirements, then the 
Exchange shall conduct a Hearing with the Listed Company. 
2. If the Exchange decides to do the delisting, the Exchange shall 
make a notification regarding the decision of the relevant Listed 
Company delisting and the delisting schedule on the same 
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exchange day as the decision of the delisting of shares with a copy 
to Bapepam. 
3. The Exchange will then declare at the Exchange regarding 
delisting decision of the Listed Company as well as the delisting 
schedule of the relevant Listed Company. Announcement will be 
conducted ,at the latest, in the beginning of session I next 
exchange day after the delisting decision by the Exchange. 
4. If necessary, the Exchange may suspend the delisted share for 5 
Exchange days and will further trade the shares only at Negotiable 
Market for 20 Exchange days prior to the effective date of the 
Delisting. 
5. The delisting shall be effective on the date agreed by the 
Exchange in the Delisting decision, and shall be announced at the 
Exchange. 
 
 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Delisting 
Delisting activity is mostly related to negative effects, but it also 
benefits the company for some reasons: 
1. Listing Costs Termination 
Djama, et al (2012), as well as Leuz (2004), Marosi and Massoud 
(2005), divided the costs of stock exchange listing into direct costs 
and indirect costs. Direct costs contain the fixed costs following IPOs, 
such as registration cost and underwriting fees, covering annual listing 
fees imposed by the stock exchange regulation and trading costs. 
While indirect costs are mainly related to the responsibility of 
company’s top level management (executives, directors and board) in 
publicly information production costs (i.e., publication costs related to 
disclosure and audit costs), as well as compliance costs to meet 
regulatory and corporate governance standards, and opportunity costs. 
 
For some firms, the costs of maintaining a listing outweigh the 
benefits (Mantysaari, 2009). By delisting its stock in the stock 
exchange market, companies are no longer required to pay such fees; 
therefore they can minimize the costs incurred, especially for small 
companies which have infrequently traded stocks. 
 
2. Flexibility and Private Benefits 
Flexibility, based on Parker (2004), means when a firm is private and 
relatively closely held, several sections of corporate governance can 
be conducted informally. Unlike publicly listed companies, private 
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companies may conduct flexible management system without afraid 
of being suspended by the regulation (Widjaja and Risnamanitis, 
2009), for example general shareholders meeting may or may not 
actually be held on an annual basis (Parker, 2004).  Private equity 
investors are likely attracted to less-monitored firms (private 
companies) because of higher potential for value creation/flexibility 
(Djama et al., 2012). 
 
3. Long-Term Focus 
Public companies, as stated by Parker (2004), are often forced to 
focus on quarterly results, in contrast to long-term goals and 
strategies. Moreover, he stated that public companies are frequently 
encountered with the dilemma of suspending promising long-term 
projects that may have a negative impact on short-term (quarterly) 
results. Thus, through delisting, company permits its management to 
focus on long-term goals, rather than to satisfy next short-term 
earnings (Parker, 2004; Public Company Considerations for Going 
Private, 2012). 
 
On the other hand, beside of some advantages stated above, the 
negative effects should also be considered. Widjaja and Risnamanitis 
(2009) stated some consequences, from the perspective of company as 
issuer, investors, and its securities, will occur if a publicly held 
company turn to private company. Some negative 
effects/disadvantages that may be caused by company’s delisting are 
as follows: 
1. Effect to Company as Issuer 
The main purpose of why company issue stock publicly through stock 
exchange market is to raise capital more rapidly and effectively for 
the sake of its growth rather than borrowing from financial 
institutions, e.g. bank. Moreover, a listed company receives more 
privileges, for example, it will be easier to loan on long-term debt for 
a listed company rather than a private company, because of the trust 
of company’s credibility (Widjaja et al., 2009). Through delisting, 
company is no longer getting such privilege. Sanger (1990), as well as 
Chandy, et al. (2004), also supported negative effect of delisting to the 
company which decreases the value of the firm by diminishing its 
liquidity. 
2. Effect to Company’s Share 
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The most immediate effect of delisting announcement is on its share 
price (Macey et al., 2003). A research done by Macey, O’Hara and 
Pompilio (2003) shows a significant dropping price of share, at 
approximately half of the price, after delisting announcement (on the 
last day of NYSE trading, the average stock in the sample closed at a 
price of$0.95, but on the first day post-delisting, the average stock 
closed at $0.48; similarly occurred for large stocks which drops from 
0.63 to 0.28 after delisting). These effects suggest both that the 
delisting event was not anticipated by the market, and that it is a 
traumatic event for the stock and its investors. 
 
In addition, You et al. (2009) identified that delisting also caused the 
changes in trading volume. They then stated, through their research, 
that the delisting event forces the trading volume to be steadily 
declined and fell back to a level that is even lower than the trading 
volume ten years before the delisting. By interpreting the trading 
volume as a liquidity measurement, they also concluded that the 
delisting reduces liquidity on the long-run effect. 
 
3. Effect to Investors 
Investors are, of course, seeking to receive high capital gain from 
company’s shares which they invested in. But, what investors must 
consider is investment in capital market is like a two-sided knife; they 
could multiply their wealth or lose all their investment.  
“The investors will lose the opportunity to trade in these 
securities. In other words, consequent to delisting of securities, 
the investors will lose liquidity of their holdings. In such a case, 
the investors may not have any exit route.” (Siddaiah, 2011) 
Through company’s delisting, a worst case scenario which investors 
might face is a very large costs, with a falling of share prices which 
approximately half of the price (Macey et al., 2003). And again, the 
delisting event could be such a traumatic event for the investors of 
capital market. 
 
Determinant Factors of Company Delisting 
 Profitability 
Profitability of a firm is also a significant determinant factor of 
company’s survivorship. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) identified 
that one of the important determinants for firm’s survival in the U.S. 
market is profitability. They found that firms voluntarily delisting 
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following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley have low average of 
profitability, median assets and market capitalization less than $230 
million. By using the ROA as a measurement of profitability, 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) observed over the results of entire 
sample period, 1961-2004, that at the time of listing, the delisted firms 
have lower profitability in comparison to the stay listed firms. 
Moreover, they stated that both voluntary and involuntary delists have 
negative ROA on average, compared to New Lists. Their research 
then draw in a conclusion which is stated that larger, more profitable 
firms, with proportionally more U.S. trading volume, and the ability 
to raise capital are more likely to survive in the U.S. market, or in 
other words more invulnerable from delisting. Sanger (1990) stated 
that most delisting events result from a failure to meet numerical 
standards; one of them which are related to profitability is minimum 
net income. Negative abnormal returns also found in a sample of 17 
delisted firms by Edelman and Baker (1987). Later, Edelman and 
Baker (1990, 1992) concluded that while delisting may decrease the 
value of a firm by diminishing its liquidity, consistent with a rational 
market response to the negative performance that usually leads to 
delisting. 
 
 Share’s Liquidity 
Mehran and Pestriani (2009) stated that the main factor behind the 
decision to go private is liquidity of company’s stock/share. Chandy, 
Sarkar and Tripathy (2004), through their research, concluded that a 
stock’s liquidity, market value and cost of capital could be adversely 
affected by delisting occurred from the National Market System 
(NMS); however, rather than be the effect of removal, these adverse 
conditions could also be a cause of a firm’s delisting from NMS. 
Angel et al. (2004), as well as You, Parhizgari, and Srivastava (2009), 
using volume of stock’s trading as a measurement of liquidity. Angel 
et al. (2004) investigated a sample of 1098 delisted firms from 
NASDAQ between 1999 through 2002 and considered a period of 
three months before and after the involuntary delisting date and found 
out that involuntary delisting is related to a large decline in liquidity, 
which is a decline of approximately two-thirds of the trading volume. 
In conclusion, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006), Mehran and 
Peristiani (2009), Djama, Martinez and Serve (2012), You, Parhizgari, 
and Srivastava (2009), as well as Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2004), 
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agreed that trading volume is  significant determinant of firm’s 
delisting from the market. 
 
 Market Capitalization (Share Price) 
Gibson (2011), through his book Financial Statement Analysis, define 
market capitalization as follows: 
“Market capitalization is total value of an entity’s outstanding shares 
at a point in time which reflects the value investors place on a 
company. It is computed by multiplying the number of common shares 
outstanding by the share price.” 
 
In order to find the relationship between market capitalization and 
delisting event, several literatures have been found to support the idea. 
Firstly, Seguin and Smoller (1997) found that based on a sample of 
5896 delisted firms from 1974 to 1988, market capitalization and 
stock price become two primary determinants for the firm’s mortality. 
Macey, O’Hara, and Pompilio (2003), Li, Zhang and Zhou (2006), 
along with Djama, Martinez and Serve (2012) stated that exchange, 
such as NYSE, sets out numerical requirement standards for firms to 
remain listed in which exchange the firms are listed in. One of the 
standards is the minimum market capitalization. Failing to meet the 
minimum market capitalization will caused the firm to get delisted by 
the exchange (Macey et al., 2003). Using share price as a proxy of 
market capitalization, some relevant literatures have been found. The 
share price, as a vital measurement of market capitalization, has 
played an important role in delisting event of a firm. Supporting 
previous idea, Seguin and Smoller (1997) discovered that the 
probability of firm’s removal is higher for the stocks with lower 
prices. The management of a firm may decide to go private when they 
found the share price is undervalued; the decision due to strategic 
reasons, which are to extract private benefits and to avoid the 
opportunity costs of staying listed (Kim and Lyn, 1991). Whereas, a 
fall in stock price could also lead to involuntary delisting (Djama et 
al., 2012), which consequently affected to the investors’ wealth 
adversely (Baker and Kennedy, 2002).  
 
 Firm’s Leverage 
Leverage, also known as borrowing capacity ratio, as defined by 
Gibson (2011), measures the degree of protection of supplier of long-
term funds. Gibson (2011) then distinguished leverage into operating 
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leverage and financial leverage. Operating leverage is defined as the 
existence of operating costs which affects earnings, while financial 
leverage is the use of debt which has a significant impact to the 
earnings. Several studies found the significance between firm’s 
leverage and the delisting events.  Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu 
(1990), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Leuz, Triantis and 
Wang (2004), Marosi and Massoud (2005), Li, Zhang, Zou (2006), 
Thomsen and Vinten (2007), Chemla et al. (2008), Harris (2009), 
Hansen et al. (2009), Chen (2010) and Djama, Martinez and Serve 
(2012), found that leverage is a significant characteristic that appeared 
to be driving factor of delisting. Li, Zhang, and Zou (2006), through 
their studies with a sample of 3898 IPOs issues in the period of 1980-
1999 that recorded in Securities Data Corporation (SDC) New Issues 
database, investigated that the failed firms show higher risk in 
financial leverage; riskier firms are more likely to fail/delist. Similar 
ideas stated that highly leverage firms are more likely to delist also 
documented by Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu (1990), DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2004), 
Marosi and Massoud (2005). Consistent with the findings in prior 
studies, Chen et al. (2010) found a positive relationship of leverage 
and delisting probability since higher leverage would increase default 
risk, leading to more delistings; this idea also supported by Marosi 
and Massoud (2005) which, through their research of a sample of 406 
deregistering firms in the SEC’s EDGAR database for January 1996-
May 2004 period, found that a 1% increases in leverage increases the 
probability of delisting increase by 31%. 
 
 Firm’s Growth Opportunity 
Kim and Lyn (1991), Fama and French (2004), Marosi and Massoud 
(2005), Weir et al. (2005), Li, Zhang and Zou (2006), Leuz et al. 
(2008), Bharath and Dittmar (2010), Martinez and Serve (2011), 
agreed that delisting also triggered by the firm’s growth. Weir et al. 
(2005) made his investigation from 1998 to 2001 about the incentives 
of delisting decision by comparing the characteristics of 117 Leverage 
Buy-Out (LBO) firms with those of a random sample of 362 public 
companies. He discovered that the delisted firms had lower growth 
opportunities, as measured by Q ratio, compared to the public firms. 
Li, Zhang and Zou (2006) also concluded that one controlling 
variables that related significantly to delisting rates of IPOs is the 
growth of the firms; the higher the growth of the firms’ value the 
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higher the probability for the firms to survive after IPO, which also 
supported by Marosi and Massoud (2005). Thomsen and Vinten 
(2007) noted that highly valued companies have better growth 
opportunities and may therefore find it profitable to remain listed to 
finance further expansion. The authors then described further that 
low-growth firms will benefit less from being listed, therefore they 
choose to delist from the exchange to reduce the cost of being listed. 
Leuz et al. (2008) also confirmed this idea through their research 
about the impact of SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) on the deregistration 
decision with a sample of 480 delisted firms in the period between 
1998 and 2004. The authors found that smaller firms with poor 
performance and growth opportunities, for which the compliance cost 
are particularly burdensome, are more likely to delist. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
This subchapter describes the essential hypotheseswhich are relevant 
to delisting events which occurred in Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
Some determinant factors of delisting, which are stated in the 
theoretical framework above, are not included in the hypotheses due 
to difficulties in obtaining the data. Therefore, to make the research 
feasible and reliable, the author considered some determinants which 
are significant to be included in the development of hypotheses. By 
considering several literatures, and to conclude this research, five 
hypotheses are presented. The discussion for the development of each 
hypothesis is explained as follows: 
First Hypothesis: 
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2006) studied and observed the listings 
and delistings of foreign firms from major U.S. exchanges over the 
period of approximately 40 years, from 1961-2004; they found that 
the delisted firms have lower profitability if compared to the listed 
firms. Edelman and Baker (1990, 1992) stated thatnegative 
performance of the firm usually leads to delisting, consistent with a 
rational market response. Those researches drew a same concluding 
idea that the lower the profitability of the firm, the more likely the 
firm delist from the exchange. This conclusion then drives to the 
elaboration of first hypothesis, which is: 
H1 : Profitability of the firm decreases delisting probability 
 
Second Hypothesis: 
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Based on the conclusion of their research, Chandy, Sarkar and 
Tripathy (2004) established that a stock’s liquidity, as well as market 
value and cost of capital, could be a cause of firms’ removal in the 
National Market System (NMS), even though sometimes these 
variables also can act as the effect of the firms’ removal from stock 
exchange. In short, Chandy et al. (2004) stated that stock’s liquidity 
could act as both cause and effect of delisting of a firm. To support 
this idea, found from different literature, Angel et al. (2004) found 
that delisting is related to a large decline in liquidity, which is a 
decline of approximately two-thirds of the trading volume by studied 
a sample of 1098 delisted firms from NASDAQ between 1999 
through 2002 and considered a period of three months before and after 
the delisting date. Hence, from several supporting literatures, the 
second hypothesis is: 
H2 : Share’s liquidity of the firm decreases delisting 
probability 
 
Third Hypothesis: 
Macey et al. (2003) stated that one standard requirement for listing 
procedure is having a minimum market capitalization standard. The 
share price, as a vital measurement of market capitalization, has been 
a significant determinant in delisting event of a firm; the lower the 
price of share the higher the probability of the delisting of the firm 
(Seguin and Smoller, 1997). Kim and Lyn (1991) documented that 
due to strategic reasons, when the management of the firm found that 
the share price is undervalued, they may decide to go private, on in 
other words getting delist from the stock exchange. This idea also 
supported by Djama et al. (2012) which stated that a fall in stock price 
could also lead to involuntary delisting. Based on those philosophies, 
the third hypothesis is summarized as follows: 
H3 : Market capitalization of the firm decreases delisting 
probability 
 
Fourth Hypothesis: 
Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu (1990), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Skinner (1996), Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2004), Marosi and 
Massoud (2005), Li, Zhang, and Zou (2006), and Chen et al. (2010) 
agreed that highly leverage firms are more likely to delist. Marosi and 
Massoud (2005), from their research of a sample of 406 deregistering 
firms in the SEC’s EDGAR database for January 1996-May 2004 
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period, found that a 1% increase in leverage increases the probability 
of delisting increase by 31%. Li, Zang, Zhou (2006) studied a sample 
of 3898 IPOs issues in the period of approximately 2 decades 
(between 1980 and 1999) that recorded in Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) New Issues database and investigated that riskier firms which 
have higher financial leverage are more likely to fail/delist. 
Additionally, a positive relationship of leverage and delisting 
probability has also been documented by Chen et al. (2010), since 
higher leverage would increase default risk which leading to higher 
delisting probability. To support the goal of this thesis, based on 
literatures and research done by the author, hence, the fourth 
hypothesis is proposed as follows: 
H4 : Firm’s leverage increases delisting probability 
 
Fifth Hypothesis: 
Weir et al. (2005) suggested that the delisted firms had lower growth 
opportunities compared to the listed public firms. Marosi and 
Massoud (2005), as well as Li, Zhang and Zou (2006), also concluded 
that the higher the growth of the firms’ value the higher the 
probability for the firms to survive from delisting. Moreover, higher 
value firms, which have better growth opportunities, may find it an 
advantage to remain listed for their further expansion, while the 
lower-growth firms will choose to delist from exchange because they 
benefit less from being listed and to reduce the listing costs (Thomsen 
and Vinten, 2007). This idea also confirmed by Leuz et al. (2008) by a 
conclusion that smaller firms with poor performance and growth 
opportunities are more likely to delist. By supporting the literature, 
this thesis would like to test the last hypothesis which is as follows: 
H5 : Firm’s Growth Opportunity decreases delisting 
probability 
 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
Sampling Design 
This thesis utilizes nonprobability sampling, in which the elements in 
the population, in this case are the delisted firms in IDX, do not have 
a known or predetermined chance probability of being selected as a 
sample subjects (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010). The sample of the firms 
is selected based on the firms which is delisted from Indonesia Stock 
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Exchange for a period of 2007-2011, which are 31 firms. To 
differentiate the probability of delisting, a matching firm is selected to 
accompany each delisted firms. 
The matching firm criteria are as follows: 
1. Firms have stocks which are actively traded firm in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. 
2. Firms have the same industry as the delisted firm, which means 
that matching firms are chosen in the same industry classification 
in which listed in the IDX. 
3. Firms have approximately same size based on the first year of 
delisted firms sampling. The first year of delisted firms sampling 
means the size of the delisted companies which is 3 years before it 
is delisted. The size is compared, firstly, by the market 
capitalization, as supported by Hackston and Milne (1996), Chan, 
Covrig, Ng (2004), Huberman and Halka (2005) and from the 
website of Investopedia. However, some firms don’t have 
approximately the same market capitalization, therefore, the 
alternative for determining the matching firm size is based on the 
total assets, which is supported by Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Barnhart, Marr, and Rosenstein (1994), and Mitton (2002). 
 
Data Collection Method 
First, the financial statements of sample firms in a period of 3 years 
are downloaded through IDX directory of financial statement. This 
data collection method is considered as data collection through 
mechanical observation, because the data is provided in company’s 
record, without researcher being physically present (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2010). The essential data which are relevant to the research 
then extracted from the financial statements into the Microsoft Excel 
worksheet to be processed later. The data is processed by calculated 
into the formulas which discussed further in the next section. Finally, 
after obtaining the desired proxies through formula calculation of 
data, the data are ready to be analyzed. 
 
Research Variables, Measures, and Model 
This subchapter describes the essentials that act as a basic 
methodology for the research. Based on the theoretical foundation and 
review of several literatures above, this segment would selects the 
proxy used as a measurement of each delisting determinant in this 
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thesis. This section will analyzed further about those proxies, which 
are as follows: 
a) Profitability 
Consistent with the research conducted Chaplinsky and Ramchand 
(2006), this paper uses Return On Assets (ROA) as a measurement of 
profitability. Return on Assets is computed as net income before 
noncontrolling interest and nonrecurring items divided by the average 
total assets of prior year and current year (Gibson, 2011). The ROA 
term is as follows: 
 
where: 
ROAt= Return on Assets for the firm in year t 
NIt= Net Incomefor the firm at the end of year t before noncontrolling 
interest and nonrecurring items 
TAt= Total Assets for the firm at the end of year t 
TAt-1 = Total Assets for the firm at the end of a year before t 
 
b) Share’s Liquidity 
You, Parhizgari, and Srivastava (2009), through their research of the 
355 foreign cross-listing and delisting stocks in 39 countries from 
1992 to 2007, examined the changes in price, liquidity and risk in 
reaction to those cross-listing and delisting. The percentage change in 
share’s trading volume of firm can’t be utilized as a measurement for 
share’s liquidity because some of the delisted firms have zero number 
in trading volume for consecutive years, therefore the data cannot be 
processed further. Therefore, by adopting Brown, Crocker, Foerster 
(2007), Lo and Wang (2009), Ibbotson, Chen and Hu (2011), share 
turnover, which calculated by dividing total trading volume to number 
of shares outstanding, will be utilized as a measurement for share’s 
liquidity of the firm to measure its effect to delisted firms. The term is 
as follows: 
 
where: 
STt = Shares Turnover of firm for year t 
TVt = Share’s trading volume of firm at the end of year t 
#sharest= Number of shares outstanding of firm at the end of year t 
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c) Market Capitalization 
Market capitalization is computed by multiplying number of shares 
outstanding and the price of the shares. Consistent with a literature 
review above, the share price is become a vital measurement of 
market capitalization (Seguin and Smoller, 1997). Moreover, Djama 
et al. (2012) confirmed that a change in stock price could lead to 
delisting, which consequently affected to the investors’ wealth 
adversely (Baker and Kennedy, 2002).Therefore, to measure the 
market capitalization, this thesis utilizes the percentage change in 
share price of the firm. The term is as follows: 
 
where: 
%ΔSPt = Percentage change in share price of the firm for yeart 
SPt = Share Price of the firmat the end of year t 
SPt-1 = Share Priceof the firm at the end of a year before t 
 
d) Firm’s Leverage 
Leverage is a measure of the degree of protection of long-term funds’ 
supplier (Gibson, 2011). Leverage also known as borrowing capacity 
ratio. By adopting Marosi and Massoud (2005), as well as Chemla, 
Pop, and Pop (2008), the leverage of the firm is computed as a ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets of the firm, which is also known as debt 
ratio. Therefore, as supported by literatures above, this thesis utilizes 
Debt Ratio as a measurement/proxy of leverage. The term is as 
follows: 
 
Where: 
DRt= Debt ratio of firm for year t 
TLt= Total Liabilities of firm for year t 
TAt = Total Assets of firm for year t 
 
e) Firm’s Growth Opportunity 
According to Weir et al. (2005) and Thomsen and Vinten (2007), this 
research apply Tobin’s Q ratio as the proxy of firm’s growth 
opportunity. Weir et al. (2005) revealed that the delisted firms had 
lower growth opportunities as measured by the Q ratios. Thomsen and 
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Vinten (2007) confirmed this idea by stated that Q ratio is higher for 
firms that remain listed since they have better growth prospects and 
more expensive to buy. For the firm’s growth opportunity, this thesis 
utilizes Marginal Tobin’s Q ratio rather than the actual Tobin’s Q 
ratio due to inflated standard deviation of the data. The marginal 
Tobin’s Q ratio term is as follows: 
 
where: 
Qt = Tobin’s Q ratio for firm in the year t 
EMVt= Equity Market Value of a firm at the end of year t (number of 
shares outstanding multiplied by closing year end share price) 
EBVt= Equity Book Value of a firm at the end of year t 
 
Research Model and Data Analysis Method 
Research 
Model
 
Figure 1. Research Framework  
 
The figure above shows the independent and dependent variables that 
can be identified in this research. 
 
Share’s Liquidity 
 
Profitability 
 
Market Capitalization 
 
Leverage 
 
Growth Opportunity 
 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable 
 
DELISTING 
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This research utilizes logistic regression model, since the dependent 
variable, in this case which is probability of delisting, is coded 1 for 
delisted company and 0 for non-delisted company. This is also known 
as dummy variable (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010; Cooper and Schindler, 
2008). DeFusco (2007) stated that logistic regression is a statistical 
technique used to predict the probability between a dependent variable 
and a set of independent variable to a logit function logistic curve. 
The logistic regression model equation of this research is as follows: 
 
 
 
where: 
 Delit = Delisting probability of firm i at year t, which take a value of 
1 if the company was delisted, and 0, otherwise 
β0 = Constant Variable 
β1,  β2,…, β5 = regression coefficients 
ROAit= Return on Assets ratio of firmi at year t 
STit= Share’s Turnover of firm i at year t 
%ΔSPit= Percentage change in share price of firmi at year t 
DRit= Debt ratio of firmi at year t 
Qit= Tobin’s q ratio of firm i at year t 
ɛ it= unobserved error component of firm i at year t 
 
 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Final Sample Selection 
As stated in the previous chapter, the sample of this research is 
selected based on the firms which are delisted from Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from year 2007 to 2011 and the selected matching 
companies for each delisted company, which are 31 delisted 
companies and its matching firms. Unfortunately, due to the 
insufficient data of variables needed in the research, two companies 
are ineligible to be included in the research, in which PT Great River 
International Tbk. (IDX: GRIV) and PT 
KorporaPersadaInvestamaTbk. (IDX: KOPI). PT Great River 
International Tbk. (IDX: GRIV) is omitted due to unavailability of 
financial statements and annual reports for the consecutive 2 sample 
years, which are in 2005 and 2006. PT KorporaPersadaInvestama also 
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share similar issue, in which it is failed to present the financial 
statements and annual reports for the year 2006. 
 
The rest of 29 delisted companies consist of 16 voluntary delisting 
(including mergers) and 13 forced delisting. Hence, the final samples 
of this research are 58 companies, in which 29 delisted firms and a 
matching firm for each delisted firms, as listed in the Appendix A. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
This section identifies the analysis on central tendency (measured by 
minimum, maximum and mean) and the variability (measured by 
standard deviation) of the observations’ distribution through 5 
independent variables in 3 years. The analysis itself is grouped among 
the delisted group and the nondelisted group. The variables are ROA 
(Return on Assets), ST (Share’s Turnover), SP (Percentage change in 
Share Price), DR (Debt Ratio), and Q (Tobin’s Q ratio). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Delisted Firms (Del = 1) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA3 29 -.3560 .1630 -.0182 .1339 
ROA2 29 -.2460 .2510 -.0077 .1082 
ROA1 29 -.5140 .3500 -.0528 .1965 
ST3 29 .0000 1.8670 .1240 .3516 
ST2 29 .0000 .8440 .0672 .1667 
ST1 29 .0000 .7280 .0677 .1589 
SP3 29 -.8690 3.0000 .1427 .6902 
SP2 29 -.3650 .9280 .0763 .2616 
SP1 29 -.4000 3.3750 .1726 .6375 
DR3 29 .1200 3.9680 .8010 .8249 
DR2 29 .0620 4.5980 .8354 .9079 
DR1 29 .0130 5.1950 .9037 1.0042 
Q3 29 -64.4289 21.9688 .1555 13.3447 
Q2 29 -23.6221 18.6209 1.2542 6.0607 
Q1 29 -10.8086 295.7429 11.5565 54.8871 
      
 
From the statistics above, the average Return on Assets in year t-3 of 
29 delisted firms is 1.82%, the average Return on Assets in year t-2 is 
-0.77%, and the mean of Return on Assets in year t-1 5.28%. The 
statistics do not show a clear trend of decreasing or increasing of 
ROA pre-delisting. 
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Secondly, the average shares turnover in year t-3 of 29 delisted firms 
is 12.4%. The variability of ST3 is considered high, as the standard 
deviation of ST3 (=0.3516) is greater than its mean (0.1240). Next, 
the average turnover of shares in year t-2 is 6.72%. The variability of 
ST2 is considered medium, as the standard deviation of ST2 
(=0.1667) is slightly higher than its mean (=0.0672). Next, the 
average share’s turnover in year t-1 of 29 delisted firms is 6.77%. The 
variability of ST1 is considered medium, as the standard deviation of 
ST1 (=0.1589) is slightly higher than its mean (=0.0677). The delisted 
sample shows a decreasing trend of share turnover in the market 
 
Thirdly, the average percent change in share price in year t-3 of 29 
delisted firms is 14.27%. The variability of SP3 is considered high, as 
the standard deviation of SP3 (=0.6902) is greater than its mean 
(0.1427). Next, the average percent change in share price in year t-2 is 
7.63%. The variability of SP2 is considered high, as the standard 
deviation of SP2 (=0.2616) is greater than its mean (=0.0763). Next, 
the average percent change in share price in year t-1 is 17.26%. The 
variability of SP1 is considered high, as the standard deviation of SP1 
(=0.6375) is greater than its mean (=0.1726). Although the turnover of 
the shares indicated the decreasing trend, the share price changes of 
the sample trend in the pre-delisting period, do not show a clear trend, 
 
Fourthly, the mean of debt ratio in year t-3 of 29 delisted firms is 
80.1%. The variability of DR3 is considered medium, as the standard 
deviation of DR3 (=0.8249) is slightly higher than its mean (0.8010). 
Next, the average debt ratio in year t-2 is 83.54%. The variability of 
DR2 is considered medium, as the standard deviation of DR2 
(=0.9079) is slightly higher than its mean (=0.8354). Next, the 
average debt ratio in year t-1 of 29 delisted firms is 90.372%. The 
variability of DR1 is considered medium, as the standard deviation of 
DR1 (=1.0042) is slightly higher than its mean (=0.9037).  The 
internal factor of delisted sample show a clear increasing debt ratio for 
the last 3 years preceding the delisted. This indicates on average the 
delisting companies experienced financial distress prior to delisting. 
 
Lastly, the average Tobin’s Q ratio, as a measurement of firm’s 
growth opportunity, in year t-3 of 29 delisted firms is 0.1555. The 
variability of Q3 is considered high, as the standard deviation of Q3 
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(=13.3447) is greater than its mean (0.1555). Next, the average 
Tobin’s Q ratio in year t-2 is 1.2542. The variability of Q2 is 
considered high, as the standard deviation of Q2 (=6.0607) is higher 
than its mean (=1.2542). Next, the average Tobin’s Q ratio in year t-1 
of 29 delisted firms is 11.5565. The variability of Q1 is considered 
high, as the standard deviation of Q1 (=54.8871) is higher than its 
mean (=11.5565). The Tobin’s Q ratio of delisted sample shows an 
increasing trend. However, this statistic cannot be interpreted that the 
sample growth opportunity increases. Since the there is an increasing 
trend of debt ratio, the increasing Tobin’s Q ratio is driven more in the 
decreasing book value of equity, rather than the market value of 
equity. 
 
As a comparison, the descriptive statistics of Non-delisted companies 
(matching companies) are presented below. 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Non-Delisted Firms (ProbDel = 0) 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ROA3 29 -.5450 .8860 .0505 .2081 
ROA2 29 -.0760 .3520 .0360 .0745 
ROA1 29 -.1770 .4160 .0252 .1037 
ST3 29 .0000 1.6410 .3254 .4576 
ST2 29 .0000 3.6890 .5730 .7947 
ST1 29 .0000 2.9010 .4198 .7018 
SP3 29 -.8600 2.7270 .1503 .6860 
SP2 29 -.6940 11.9230 .7936 2.2773 
SP1 29 -.9440 3.3750 .1662 1.0017 
DR3 29 .0660 1.0880 .5638 .2595 
DR2 29 .0160 .8990 .5227 .2307 
DR1 29 .0170 .9010 .5417 .2378 
Q3 29 -2.6444 4.6114 1.3577 1.3398 
Q2 29 .3745 35.4468 2.9744 6.4343 
Q1 28 .0538 65.6893 4.0917 12.3178 
      
 
After analyze the descriptive statistics of delisted companies, the 
descriptive of nondelisted companies are as follows. The average 
Return on Assets in year t-3 of 29 nondelisted firms is -5.05%. The 
variability of ROA3 is considered high, as the standard deviation of 
ROA3 (=0.2081) is greater than its mean (-0.0182). Next, the average 
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Return on Assets in year t-2 is 3.60%. The variability of ROA2 is 
considered medium, as the standard deviation of ROA2 (=0.0745) is 
slightly higher than its mean (=0.0360). Next, the average Return on 
Assets in year t-1 is 2.52%. The variability of ROA1 is considered 
medium, as the standard deviation of ROA1 (=0.1037) is slightly 
greater than its mean (=0.0252). There is no clear trend of ROA of the 
matching companies in the last 3 years of delisting period. 
 
Secondly, the average turnover of shares in year t-3 of 29 nondelisted 
firms is 32.54%. The variability of ST3 is considered medium, as the 
standard deviation of ST3 (=0.4576) is greater than its mean (0.3254). 
Next, the average share’s turnover in year t-2 is 57.3%. The 
variability of ST2 is considered medium, as the standard deviation of 
ST2 (=0.7947) is slightly higher than its mean (=0.5730). Next, the 
average share turnover in year t-1 is 41.98%. The variability of ST1 is 
considered medium, as the standard deviation of ST1 (=0.7018) is 
slightly higher than its mean (=0.4198). Unlike the delisting sample, 
the matching companies sample does not show the declining of share 
turnover. However, the average turnover in the last 3 years before the 
delisting period, the matching companies show a significant higher 
share turnover compared to the matching companies. 
 
Thirdly, the average percent change in share price in year t-3 of 29 
nondelisted firms is 15.03%. The variability of SP3 is considered 
high, as the standard deviation of SP3 (=0.6860) is greater than its 
mean (0.1503). Next, the average percent change in share price in 
year t-2 of 29 nondelisted firms is 79.36%. The variability of SP2 is 
considered high, as the standard deviation of SP2 (=2.2773) is greater 
than its mean (=0.7936). Next, the average percent change in share 
price in year t-1 of 29 nondelisted firms is 16.62%. The variability of 
SP1 is considered high, as the standard deviation of SP1 (=1.0017) is 
greater than its mean (=0.1662). 
 
Fourthly, the average debt ratio in year t-3 of 29 delisted firms is 
56.38%. The variability of DR3 is considered low, as the standard 
deviation of DR3 (=0.2595) is lower than its mean (0.5638). Next the 
average debt ratio in year t-2 of 29 nondelisted firms is 52.27%. The 
variability of DR2 is considered low, as the standard deviation of DR2 
(=0.2307) is lower than its mean (=0.5227). Next, the average debt 
ratio in year t-1 of 29 nondelisted firms is 54.17%. The variability of 
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DR1 is considered low, as the standard deviation of DR1 (=0.2378) is 
lower than its mean (=0.5417). 
 
Lastly, for the nondelisted group section, the mean of Q3 is 1.3577. 
Hence, the average Tobin’s Q ratio, as a measurement of firm’s 
growth opportunity, in year t-3 of 29 nondelisted firms is 1.3577. The 
variability of Q3 is considered low, as the standard deviation of Q3 
(=1.3398) is almost similar to its mean (=1.3577). Next, the average 
Tobin’s Q ratio in year t-2 of 29 nondelisted firms is 2.9744. The 
variability of Q2 is considered high, as the standard deviation of Q2 
(=6.4343) is slightly higher than its mean (=2.9744). Next, the 
average Tobin’s Q ratio in year t-1 of 29 nondelisted firms is 4.0917. 
The variability of Q1 is considered high, as the standard deviation of 
Q1 (=12.3178) is higher than its mean (=4.0917). 
 
Independent Sample T-test 
The two independent samples t-tests are utilized to compare the 
statistics of two sub- and to test the difference. The results are 
presented in table below. The analysis is explained after the table 
below, as follows: 
 
Table 4. Group Statistics – Independent Sample Test 
Del 
N Variable Mean Std.  
Deviation 
Std. Error Mean t-test for Equality of 
Means 
t df Sig (2-
tailed) 
R
O
A
3 
1 29  -.01824 .133865 .024858 
-1.496 47.780 .141 
0 29 ROA3 .05048 .208134 .038650 
R
O
A
2 
1 29 ROA2 -.00772 .108153 .020084 
-1.794 49.690 .079 
0 29  .03603 .074505 .013835 
R
O
A
1 
1 29 ROA1 -.05276 .196472 .036484 
-1.891 42.474 .065 
0 29  .02524 .103686 .019254 
S
T
3 
1 29 ST3 .12400 .351553 .065282 
-1.879 52.511 .066 
0 29  .32538 .457627 .084979 
S
T
2 
1 29  .06724 .166684 .030952 
-3.354 30.459 .002 
0 29 ST2 .57300 .794695 .147571 
S
T
1 
1 29 ST1 .06772 .158935 .029513 
-2.635 30.865 .013 
0 29  .41983 .701800 .130321 
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S
P
3 
1 29  .14272 .690225 .128172 
-.042 55.998 .967 
0 29 SP3 .15031 .685964 .127380 
S
P
2 
1 29 SP2 .07634 .261599 .048578 
-1.685 28.739 .103 
0 29  .79362 2.277312 .422886 
S
P
1 
1 29 SP1 .17259 .637549 .118390 
.029 47.488 .977 
0 29  .16621 1.001689 .186009 
D
R
3 
1 29  .80100 .824885 .153177 
1.477 33.489 .149 
0 29 DR3 .56383 .259526 .048193 
D
R
2 
1 29 DR2 .83538 .907854 .168584 
1.798 31.602 .082 
0 29  .52266 .230721 .042844 
D
R
1 
1 29 DR1 .90372 1.004200 .186475 
1.889 31.129 .068 
0 29  .54169 .237752 .044150 
Q
3 
1 29 Q3 .155498 13.3447466 2.4780572 
-.483 28.564 .633 
0 29  1.357682 1.3397630 .2487878 
Q
2 
1 29  1.254249 6.0606821 1.1254404 
-1.048 55.801 .299 
0 29 Q2 2.974362 6.4343353 1.1948261 
Q
1 
1 29 Q1 11.556482 54.8870580 10.1922708 
.725 30.719 .474 
0 29  3.984757 12.1095865 2.2486938 
 
where: Del = 1is the delisted companies sample 
Del = 0 is the nondelisted companies sample 
 
The table shows there are some factors that significantly differentiate 
the delisted companies and the non-delisted companies. For the last 2 
year before the delisting period, the average ROA of delisted 
companies are significantly lower than the average ROA of non-
delisting companies at α= 10%.  
 
Moreover, for the last 3 years, the delisted firm had significantly 
lower share turnover than their counterparts (at α= 10% in year t-1 
and 5% in year t-2 and t-1).   This indicates that the investors did not 
trade the shares of delisted companies as frequent as the matching 
companies. This could be as a result of the significant different of 
profitability between the two samples. The other factor is the debt 
ratio in the last 2 years that is significantly different between the two 
samples at α= 10%.   
 
Logistic Regression analysis 
This section will discuss further about the summary of the model, 
which is the R-square coefficient determination, followed by the 
analysis of the regression result in the next section. 
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Model Summary 
This section will present the analysis of how the all elements inside 
the model (independent variables) describe the prediction/model. The 
SPSS provides some estimation for R-square coefficient 
determination. The NagelkerkeR-square is chosen rather than Cox and 
Snell, because Nagelkerke is the most-reported of the R-squared 
estimates and a more reliable measure of relationship; more reliable 
because Nagelkerke modifies the Cox and Snell R-square and has a 
range from 0 to 1, which make it easier to interpret (Burns et al., 
2008). 
Table 5. Models Summary 
Nagelkerke R-Square Value 
 
Model t-3 .198 
Model t-2 .427 
Model t-1 .332 
 
In this case, the Nagelkerke R-square for a period t-3 is 0.198, which 
indicates that the predictors/independent variables can be used to 
describe the dependent variables by 19.8%, while the rest of 80.2% is 
outside the scope of the model. For the period of t-2, the Nagelkerke 
R-square is 0.427, indicating that the independent variables can 
predict the dependent variables by 42.7%, while 57.3% is outside the 
scope of the model. For the period of t-1, the Nagelkerke R-square is 
0.332, indicates that 33.2% of dependent variable’s likelihood can be 
predicted by the independent variables in the model, while 66.8% is 
outside the model scope. Based on this result, it can be concluded that 
the model that provides the best delisting prediction is modelt-2 (2 
years before delisting), which then followed by the result of t-1 and t-
3. 
Table 6. Classification Table for model t-3 
Observed 
Predicted 
ProbDel Percentage 
Correct 
0 
(nondelist) 
1 
(delist) 
 
 
ProbDel 
0 (nondelist) 16 13 55.2 
1 (delist) 9 20 69.0 
Overall Percentage   62.1 
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It can be seen that from the observations for a period of t-3, both have 
29 sample observation which are Delisted (ProbDel=1) and Non-
delisted (ProbDel=0). Among 29 observed non-delisted firms, 13 of 
them are actually could be delisted based on the observed 
characteristics of predictors with a cut value of 0.05. So the 
percentage correct is 55.2% between the observed and predicted 
values of non-delisted company (16 out of 29 is correct). Among 29 
delisted firms, 9 of them are actually can be the non-delisted firms, 
which makes 69% correct between the observed and predicted value 
of delisted company. The overall model is 62.1% accurate. 
 
Table 7. Classification Table for model t-2 
Observed 
Predicted 
ProbDel Percentage 
Correct 
0 
(nondelist) 
1 
(delist) 
 
 
ProbDel 
0 (nondelist) 18 11 62.1 
1 (delist) 3 26 89.7 
Overall Percentage   75.9 
 
Next, for the period t-2, among 29 observed non-delisted firms, 11 of 
them are actually could be delisted based on the observed 
characteristics of predictors with a cut value of 0.05. So the 
percentage correct is 62.1% between the observed and predicted 
values of non-delisted company (18 out of 29 is correct). Among 29 
delisted firms, 3 of them are actually can be the non-delisted firms, 
which makes 89.7% correct between the observed and predicted value 
of delisted company. The overall model is 75.9% accurate. 
 
Table 8. Classification Table for model t-1 
Observed 
Predicted 
ProbDel Percentage 
Correct 
0 
(nondelist) 
1 
(delist) 
 
 ProbDel 
0 (nondelist) 17 12 58.6 
1 (delist) 6 23 79.3 
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Overall Percentage   69.0 
 
 
Finally, for the period t-1, among 29 observed non-delisted firms, 12 
of them are actually could be delisted based on the observed 
characteristics of predictors with a cut value of 0.05. So the 
percentage correct is 58.6% between the observed and predicted 
values of non-delisted company (17 out of 29 is correct). Among 29 
delisted firms, 6 of them are actually can be the non-delisted firms, 
which makes 79.3% correct between the observed and predicted value 
of delisted company. The overall model is 69.0% accurate. 
Hence, based on classification matrix of the model for each year, 
again it suggests that the model is more accurate at a period t-2 with 
75.9% accuracy, followed by result of period t-1 (69% accuracy) and 
t-2 (62.1% accuracy).To conclude this section, in terms of accuracy of 
the model, a model with the most accuracy based on the logistic 
regression result will be selected from every sample (t-3, t-2, t-1). 
From the Model Summary, the Nagelkerke R-square for a period t-3, 
t-2, t-1 respectively are 0.198, 0.427 and 0.332. From the 
Classification Table, the overall predicted percentage correct for t-3, t-
2, t-1 respectively are 62.1%, 75.9%, and 69.0%. Hence, based on the 
highest result in Model Summary and Classification Table results, it 
can be concluded that the model which provides the best delisting 
prediction is model t-2, which is a period of 2 years prior to delisting 
(Nagelkerke R-square=.427, Classification Table Predicted 75.9% 
accuracy). 
 
Hypothesis Result Analysis 
This section will provide analysis of the outcomes of the logistic 
regression result for each determinant for every sample year prior to 
delisting.  
The logistic regression results for each year are presented and will be 
discussed separately, as follows: 
 
Table 9. Logistic Regression Result for Model t-3 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 
ROA3 -2.778 2.072 1.798 .180 .062 
ST3 -1.805 .915 3.896 .048 .164 
SP3 .521 .498 1.094 .296 1.683 
DR3 .709 .675 1.103 .294 2.032 
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Q3 -.008 .033 .057 .811 .992 
Constant -.100 .538 .035 .852 .904 
 
Table 10. Logistic Regression Result for Model t-2 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 
ROA2 -3.208 4.177 .590 .442 .040 
ST2 -4.272 1.667 6.566 .010 .014 
SP2 -.203 .767 .070 .791 .816 
DR2 .597 .763 .612 .434 1.816 
Q2 -.028 .070 .156 .693 .973 
Constant .590 .622 .899 .343 1.804 
 
Table 11. Logistic Regression Result for Model t-1 
 B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp (B) 
ROA1 -1.971 2.225 .785 .376 .139 
ST1 -4.057 1.938 4.383 .036 .017 
SP1 .980 .565 3.013 .083 2.666 
DR1 .496 .634 .612 .434 1.642 
Q1 .002 .010 .057 .811 1.002 
Constant .125 .550 .051 .821 1.133 
 
Profitability 
The first hypothesis is: 
Ha1 : Profitability of the firm decreases delisting probability 
 
From the table above, ROA3 has p-value of .180 and Wald value of 
1.798. This result shows an insignificant effect between Return on 
Asset in a period of 3 years before delisting (t-3) and the probability 
of delisting, although the result suggests a negative B coefficient of -
2.778, which means that profitability of a firm decreases the delisting 
probability for period t-3. These results suggest that in period t-3, 
even though there is no significant effect of Return on Asset to the 
probability of delisting, profitability of a firm is proved to decreases 
the delisting probability. But as it has no significant effect, therefore 
first hypothesis is rejected in period t-3. 
 
The ROA2 has p-value of .442 and Wald of .590, which again shows 
that there is no significant effect between Return on Asset in a period 
of 2 years before delisting (t-2) and the probability of delisting, 
although the result suggests a negative B coefficient of -3.208, which 
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means that profitability of a firm decreases the delisting probability 
for period t-2. It can be derived from the results above that in period t-
2, profitability of a firm decreases the delisting probability, but as its 
effect is not significant, the first hypothesis is rejected for period t-2. 
 
ROA1 also have a similar result as ROA2 and ROA3, in which it has 
no significant effect of Return on Asset in a period of 1 year before 
delisting (t-1) to the probability of delisting, although the result 
suggests a negative B coefficient of -1.971, which means that 
profitability of a firm decreases the delisting probability for period t-1. 
The result for period t-1 again shows no significant effect between 
profitability (ROA1) and the probability of delisting, although it 
shows that profitability decreases the delisting probability; first 
hypothesis is rejected for period t-1. 
 
There is inadequate evidence that prior yearsprofitability of a firm 
decreases the probability of delisting. Although this result have stated 
the same negative coefficient as stated by Chaplinsky and  Ramchand 
(2008) in their findings, it still contradicts to their research, which 
stated that profitability is one of important (significant) determinants 
for delisting probability in the U.S. market for the period 1961-2004; 
while in this research profitability is found insignificantly related to 
the delisting probability. This could be suggested that profitability is 
not a significant determinant of company delisting in Indonesia or the 
insignificancy is due to small sample size and low time constraint, 
comparing to Chaplinsky’s research. 
 
Shares Liquidity 
The second hypothesis is: 
Ha2: Shares liquidity of the firm decreases delisting 
probability 
 
From the table above, ST3 has p-value of .048 (p < 0.05 significance 
level) and Wald value of 3.896. This result shows that there is a 
significant effect between share’s turnover  in a period of 3 years 
before delisting (t-3) and the probability of delisting, with a negative 
value of B, which is -1.805. This means that share’s turnover (share’s 
liquidity) of a firm decreases the delisting probability for period t-3. 
Next, ST2 has a significant level of .010 and Wald of 6.566, which 
shows that there is a significant effect between turnover of shares for 
Benny, L. & Hutagaol, Yanthi /Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 25-66       (55 
a period of 2 years before delisting (t-2) and the probability of 
delisting, with a negative B value of -4.272. 
Similar result also shown in ST1 (share’s turnover for year t-1), where 
the p-value is below 0.05 significance level (p=.036, p<0.05) and has 
4.383 value of Wald, which also considered to have a significant 
effect towards the probability of delisting (B = -4.057). The negative 
value of B for share’s turnover coefficients of all years suggests that 
share’s liquidity decreases the probability of delisting, and since the p-
value is considered significantly affected the model, therefore it can 
be concluded that the second hypothesis is accepted for all sample 
periods. 
This result agrees with research done by Chandy, Sarkar, Tripathy 
(2004), as well as You, Parhizgari and Srivastava (2009), which found 
that share’s liquidity decreases delisting probability and proved that 
liquidity is statistically significant to the probability of delisting. 
Furthermore, You et al. (2009) also stated that delisting is followed by 
decreased liquidity, and it is seem persistent over the long run. 
 
Market Capitalization 
The third hypothesis is: 
Ha3 : Market capitalization of the firm decreases delisting probability 
From the table above, SP3 (changes in share price in a period of 3 
years before delisting) has p-value of .296 and Wald value of 1.094, 
which is considered to have an insignificant effect towards the 
probability of delisting. The B coefficient is positive (B=.521), which 
means that changes in share price at t-3 increases the delisting 
probability. As it is insignificant and yet increases the delisting 
probability, therefore the third hypothesis is rejected for the period t-
3. 
 
The SP2 has p-value of .791 and Wald of .070, which shows that there 
is no significant effect between changes in share price in a period of 2 
years before delisting (t-2) and the probability of delisting. The result 
of B (B=-.203) suggests that changes in share price in period t-2 
decrease the delisting probability, but as there is no significant effect 
to the probability of delisting, based on the p-value, the third 
hypothesis is rejected for period t-2. 
 
Next, p-value of SP1 which is below 0.1 level of significance (p=.083, 
p<.01) with a Wald value of 3.013, suggests that the result has a slight 
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significant and has a positive B (B=.980). But, seeing from this result, 
the third hypothesis is rejected for period t-3 since the result of market 
capitalization increase the delisting probability. 
 
The results of the effect of market capitalization, which both 
increasing and decreasing the probability of delisting, are found 
insignificant. The result of market cap causes a decrease in delisting 
probability is supported by Seguin and Smoller (1997), as well as Kim 
and Lyn (1991), due to strategic reasons; the management may decide 
to go private when they found the share price is undervalued, or else 
they are willing to extract private benefits and to avoid opportunity 
costs of staying listed. But the result in Indonesia shows that the share 
price as the proxy of market cap is not significant to determine the 
probability of delisting. Furthermore, the market cap as an 
enhancement in delisting probability is outside the scope of this 
research. 
 
Leverage 
The fourth hypothesis is: 
Ha4 : Firm’s leverage increases delisting probability 
 
From the table above, DR3 has p-value of .294 and Wald value of 
1.103. This result shows an insignificant effect between debt ratio 
(leverage) in a period of 3 years before delisting (t-3) and the 
probability of delisting, although the result suggests a positive B 
coefficient of .709, which means that leverage of a firm increases the 
delisting probability for period t-3. 
 
The DR2 has p-value of .434 and Wald of .612, which again shows 
that there is no significant effect between leverage in a period of 2 
years before delisting (t-2) and the probability of delisting, although 
the result suggests a positive B coefficient of .597, which means that a 
firm’s leverage increases the probability of delisting for period t-2. 
 
DR1 presents a similar result as DR2 and DR3, in which it has no 
significant effect (p>0.05) of leverage in a period of 1 year before 
delisting (t-1) to the probability of delisting, although the result 
suggests a positive B coefficient of .496, which means that leverage 
increases the delisting probability for period t-1. These results 
conclude that even though leverage is proved to increases the 
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probability of delisting, there is no significant effect of leverage to the 
probability of delisting, therefore fourth hypothesis is rejected for 
every sample year.Chen et al. (2010) also found a positive 
relationship of leverage and delisting probability as higher leverage 
would increase default risk, leading to more delistings; which also 
supported by Marosi and Massoud (2005), through their research of a 
sample of 406 deregistering firms in the SEC’s EDGAR database for 
January 1996-May 2004 period, found that a 1% increases in leverage 
increases the probability of delisting increase by 31%. But the results 
from this research stated that leverage is not a significant factor that 
drives to the delisting in Indonesia. 
 
Firm’s Growth Opportunity 
The last hypothesis is: 
Ha5 : Firm’s Growth Opportunity decreases delisting 
probability 
 
From the table above, Q3 (Tobin’s Q ratio in a period of 3 years 
before delisting) has p-value of .811 and Wald value of .057, which is 
considered to have an insignificant effect towards the probability of 
delisting. The B coefficient is negative (B=-0.008), which means that 
firm’s growth opportunity at t-3 decreases the delisting probability, 
but as the p-value is insignificant, the fifth hypothesis is rejected for 
period t-3. 
The Q2 has p-value of .693 and Wald of .156, which shows that there 
is no significant effect between firm’s growth opportunity in a period 
of 2 years before delisting (t-2) and the probability of delisting. The 
result of B (B=-.028) suggests that firm’s growth opportunity in 
period t-2 decrease the delisting probability, but again as its effect is 
insignificant to the probability of delisting, the hypothesis is rejected 
for period t-2. 
 Next, with p-value of .811 for Q1 and Wald value of .057, suggests 
that the result has no significant effect to the model. The Q1 has a 
diminutive positive value of B (B=.002), which means that firm’s 
growth opportunity in t-1 almost have no effect to the delisting 
probability, therefore the hypothesis is rejected for the period t-1. 
Prior studies by Weir et al. (2005), Li, Zhang and Zou (2006) and 
Leuz et al. (2008) discovered that one controlling variables that 
related significantly to delisting rates of IPOs is the growth of the 
firms (measured by Q ratio) ; the higher the growth of the firms’ value 
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the higher the probability for the firms to survive after IPO. In other 
words, the lower the growth of the firm the higher probability for the 
firms to got delisted. The result from this research in Indonesia stated 
differently. It suggests that firm’s growth opportunity is not a 
significant factor that triggered the delisting. Moreover, it stated an 
increasing effect of the probability, which is outside the research 
scope. 
In conclusion, the significant determinant factor that affects the 
probability of delisting in Indonesia, which supports prior researches 
and literatures, is share’s liquidity of a firm. Share’s liquidity 
significantly decreases the probability of delisting in Indonesia. Two 
determinants (Profitability and Leverage), which effects are correctly 
predicted in the hypothesis development in the previous Chapter 2, 
seems to be insignificantly affect to the delisting probability. In this 
research, profitability appears to insignificantly decrease the delisting 
probability, while leverage appears to insignificantly increase the 
delisting probability; this insignificancy issue could be due to small 
sample size. The other two determinants, which are market 
capitalization and growth opportunity seems to be both insignificant 
and unpredictable because of their effect of increasing and decreasing 
the probability of delisting  
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Conclusion 
Delisting is one of the most impacting issues of corporate finance 
segment which affecting the listed company in regional stock 
exchange market. The delisting phenomenon is quite a new issue in 
Indonesia, therefore not much research is found regarding delisting 
phenomenon in Indonesia.  This research is aimed to investigate 
further about the determinant factors which caused the delisting 
phenomenon in Indonesia Stock Exchange and to give a prediction for 
future issue regarding delisting of company. 
From the findings it can be concluded that there is one significant 
factor that consistently affecting delisting probability for the last 3 
years prior to the delisting, which is shares liquidity of a firm.  
Meanwhile profitability, market capitalization, leverage and growth 
opportunity appear to be insignificant towards the delisting 
probability. Some determinants although their effects on the 
Benny, L. & Hutagaol, Yanthi /Journal of Applied Finance and Accounting, 6(1), 25-66       (59 
probability of delisting are found to be statistically insignificant, the 
results show that those determinants interact with the probability of 
delisting as expected; those determinants are profitability and 
leverage. In this research, profitability seems to decrease the 
probability of delisting insignificantly, while leverage seems to 
increase the probability of delisting insignificantly. 
Based on the research findings, the delisting could be predictable as 
far as 3 years before the firm will be delisted (t-3), however the most 
accurate period to predict the delisting is 2 years before the firm will 
be delisted (t-2). 
 
To conclude this research, if it seen thoroughly, the determinant 
factors of company delisting can be divided into two major parts, 
which are internal factors (elements which come from the company 
within itself that affect the businesses, in this case, such as 
profitability, leverage, market capitalization and growth opportunity) 
and external factors (elements that affect businesses which come from 
outside of the company, such as customer, or in this case, share’s 
liquidity which is moved by the market). Based on this idea, the 
delisting phenomenon in Indonesia is more affected by the external 
factors rather than the internal factors of the company. 
 
In conducting this research, some limitations have been encountered, 
which are as follows: 
1. Sample Size 
Since the delisting phenomenon is a new issue in Indonesia, a 
sample of 29 delisted firms and its matching firms for a 5-year 
period may not represent the delisting phenomenon in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange Market fully. The insignificancy of the 
variables/determinants may also cause by the lack of sample size. 
2. Limited Source of Research Model 
As the prior researches and studies about delisting are not much, 
the author, based on own determination from limited source 
review, has selectedthe determinants which is considered to affect 
the delisting phenomenon in Indonesia. 
3. Determination of Matching Firms Selection 
The matching firms are chosen based on the matching firm criteria 
stated in chapter 3, but not all of the delisted firms have the exact 
matching firms, meaning the matching firms chosen are far from 
the matching firm criteria, due to limited firms on certain industry. 
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Recommendations 
Some recommendations to related entities are developed, regarding 
this research, which are as follows: 
1. IDX should improve its database, in terms of completeness, 
efficiency and time constraints. Investors, both local and foreign 
investors, will be relying on IDX to access important historical 
data from Indonesia Stock Exchange Market. It is inefficient for 
the investors if IDX can’t provide such information, as it is the 
center of Indonesia Financial Market. 
2. For future research, it is recommended to improve the sample size. 
Larger sample size tends to have better and more reliable 
statistical result. Widening the time frame of the research could be 
the way to enhance the sample size. 
3. To enhance the accuracy of a research regarding delisting 
determinant factors, this thesis could be utilized as a reference. 
The next researcher may use different variables or more advanced 
proxies and determinants for further studies. 
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